Category: Event Summaries

On September 22, 2020, the GW Institute for Korea (GWIKS) and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “U.S.-Korean Relations in the Era of U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry”. Moderated by Yonho Kim, Associate Director of the GW Institute for Korea, a roundtable of policy experts, representing both the United States and South Korea, engaged in a two-section discussion regarding changing dynamics in U.S.-China relations and how U.S.-Korean relations will affect or be affected by the growing tension between the two rivals.

Section one began with opening remarks from Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder, and Principal of The Marathon Initiative, and Heung-kyu Kim, Director of the U.S.-China Policy Institute at Ajou University, who both outlined the changing dynamics and relationships in play between the U.S., China, South Korea through the lenses of their respective countries. In the case of the United States, there is a grounded, straightforward approach of the continued U.S.-South Korean defensive alliance to balance against the growing threat of China, with the United States backing South Korea with continued military support and a “whole government” support system back in Washington. This comes with an increasing desire for South Korea to take steps to improve its own defense capabilities and notably, taking the lead with dealing with North Korea, a posture that has already begun through continued dialogue across the peninsula.

From the perspective of South Korea comes a fleshed out, broader outline of how the United States and China’s contention is affecting the country, which then leads into some of the disconnects and challenges posed due to their position in the alliance. Where the United States sees China as its direct rival, South Korea does not have that shared perspective due to its economic relationship with China. While South Korea is a strong ally of the United and shares concerns over growing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, their primary concern in regards to this contention is the ramifications of decoupling from China, who provide a large majority of economic incentive not just to South Korea but many of the other countries in the region. Additionally, China is also a strategic player in the denuclearization efforts of North Korea. Combined with a “confidence dilemma”, as Director Hueng-Kyu Kim describes it, of United States’ commitment and role in the Asian Pacific due to its confusing rhetoric and behavior over the years, puts South Korea in an awkward position of being morally on the same page as the United States but having a strategic gap on how to address China; a dilemma that SK-Korea Foundation Chair Jung Park believes China will take advantage of to boost its own influence in the region.

Shifting over to section two, discussing U.S.-South Korean relations in the face of growing concerns over China, Seoul National University Professor Chaesung Chun framed this conversation around two questions: what is the ultimate goal of U.S.-China policy and how might the United States and South Korea overcome challenges amongst themselves to address these issues of contention? And interesting perspective brought up by Sung-Han Kim, Dean of GSIS at Korea University brought up in the conversation of section one was that the United States and South Korea’s strategies against China could be comparable to a Balance of Power versus Containment perspectives. Where the United States wants to ensure that China does not overstep its boundaries and gain dominance in the region, South Korea is more preoccupied with ensuring Chinese aggression does not disrupt the region but does not wish to eliminate them completely. This difference in perspective plays into the disconnect between allies where the United States believes in a military approach is best in contrast to South Korea, who has taken a diplomatic and economic approach with neighboring countries and would urge the United States to step up in its own role by committing to the region similarly in order to maintain collective security against China’s behavior.

In wrapping up the roundtable discussion and considering how to address the challenges faced by both countries, many of the experts on both sides, despite having conflicting perspectives on the posturing of each other’s countries, were able to agree that discussions like these are what continues to embolden the dedicated alliance between the United States and South Korea. Continued communication and narrowing down strategies in both policy and defense are needed to ensure not only the protection and interests of both countries but to maintain peace in the South Pacific region.

On November 4, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia National Resource Center co-hosted the Korea Policy Forum on “Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula.” Yong-Sup Han, Professor at the Korea National Defense University, South Korea, discussed four potential scenarios of North Korea’s denuclearization: (i) a small deal in denuclearization (shutdown of Youngbyon plus α nuclear facilities in return for U.S. sanctions relief) and phase-1 conventional arms control (September 19 inter–Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement), (ii) a big deal in denuclearization (Final and Fully Verifiable Denuclearization of North Korean nuclear facilities and arsenal) and phase-1 conventional arms control, (iii) a small deal and phase-2 (structured) conventional arms control, and (iv) a big deal and phase-2 (structured) conventional arms control. Professor Han suggested that scenario (i) is most likely because it will allow North Korea to manage to maintain peace while implementing the September 19 inter–Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement, without having to move toward the phase-2 conventional arms control. Professor Han predicted that if Washington and Pyongyang strike a small deal, Pyongyang would want to remain as a nuclear weapon state with small arsenal.

Young-jun Kim, Professor at the Korea National Defense University, discussed the current status and the future of conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula. Professor Kim discussed the importance of Kim Jong-Un’s political objectives, including his goal of becoming independent from China and strengthening North Korean middle class for his long-term political survival. He stressed that North Korea’s motivation for conventional arms control changed from the military-first to a pragmatic economy-first policy. Professor Kim suggested that the U.S. and South Korea share long-term political and strategic objectives and design concrete steps of conventional arms control together.

Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affair at the George Washington University, pointed out the two presenters highlighted the classic dilemma in terms of determining the scale and scope and inherent values of arms control. Professor Spear suggested that to be more realistic, the denuclearization scenarios should include stasis where Washington and Pyongyang would not be able to make any breakthrough. She also stressed that U.S.  domestic politics should be factored in because the next U.S. president may have different perspectives from the Trump administration on the negotiation with North Korea.

On October 1, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia Resource Center held a Korea Policy Forum on “The U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry and the Korean Peninsula.” GWIKS brought together three experts, from South Korea, the United States, and China, who provided insights from each country’s viewpoints. The speakers discussed how the changing strategic equations surrounding the Korean peninsula will impact the security and prosperity in the region and the strategic choices and paths for the Korean peninsula.

Heung-Kyu Kim, the Founder and Director of China Policy Institute and professor in the Department of Political Science at Ajou University, South Korea, talked about the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition that has brought unprecedented challenges to South Korea’s security, foreign policies and economy. He explained that South Korea finds itself caught between the U.S. and China while being forced to make decisions. Because of this, South Korea’s traditional foreign policy orientation is no longer effective. Dr. Kim further talked about Chinese response to the competition, stating that “Chinese leadership at last fully recognized by May of 2019 that there is little chance of compromise with the U.S.” Therefore, he emphasized that South Korea may need a role of 3rd party in this competition in order to provide a space for restraints from, balancing in, mediating the competition. Dr. Kim suggested Australia as the third party to enlarge the role of middle power cooperation in his conclusion of this speech.

Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, touched on the issue of where the Korean issues stand in the U.S.-China relationship, and also reviewed how the Obama and Trump administrations have failed in terms of managing North Korean issues. While the U.S. have been continuously seeking Chinese cooperation over the U.S. Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, Mr. Snyder stressed that the U.S. needs more strategies to successfully attract China on the table as North Korea also valued the meeting between Obama and Xi Jinping as an opportunity to cooperate.

Jiyong Zheng, Professor and Director at the Center for Korean Studies, Fudan University, and Secretary-General of Shanghai Institute of Korean Studies, began with talking about the uncertainty of the relationship between the U.S. and China that caused significant confusion and fear to North and South Korea. He argued that China’s Korean peninsula policy needs to be integrated into the international community while connecting with its Belt and Road Initiative. This is because, Dr. Zheng explained, a relaxed and benevolent external environment will be created in North Korea in order to receive foreign assistance and realize sustained economic development. He stated that the idea of “nuclear weapons for peace” would more likely be replaced by “development for peace” when foreign assistance gets involved. Dr. Zheng concluded that “a commonwealth of the destiny of Northeast Asia will then be established” when North Korea receives substantial benefits from economic development because North Korea will: (i) be glad to construct a commonwealth of interests with Northeast Asian countries; and (ii) integrate itself into this region through shared perception of history, security, and development.

On October 14, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “Prospects for a Nuclear Deal with North Korea.” Moderated by Yonho Kim, Associate Director of Institute for Korean Studies, Ambassador Joseph Yun, former U.S. Representative for North Korea Policy (2016-18), discussed whether these Trump-Kim meetings are just photo-ops or if they could lead to an agreement that will denuclearize North Korea and thus change the Korean Peninsula and the region. 

Ambassador Yun started with timeline for the recent events, pointing out that on January 20, 2017, Donald Trump came into the office as the President, and there was a regime change in the U.S. and North Korea, which was willing to discuss with the U.S. Then, Kim Jung Nam was killed in the following month, and it was when tension was arising in terms of military hostility. The likelihood of military accidence was rising with President Trump criticizing Kim Jung-Un’s behavior in regard to his nuclear weapon program. 

However, Ambassador demonstrated that things have changed when Moon Jae-In sworn in as the president of South Korea in May 10, 2017. President Moon improved relations with Pyongyang and determined that the tension with North Korea would be reduced. Ambassador Yun suggested a few effects of Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore, including decrease in tension, suspended intercontinental ballistic missile testing, the U.S. giving up a joint exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, and alleviated sanctions of enforcement by Russia.   

Later, Ambassador Yun suggested a few reasons why there has been no agreement, including lack of preparation and two mistakes of North Korea. He said that the U.S. has conducted repetition of their previous actions so that they failed again and again. Meanwhile, he pointed out that North Korea made two mistakes before the Stockholm meeting. Firstly, he argued that North Korea misperceived that John Bolton’s exit would adjust the U.S. position toward North Korea radically while there were several reasons for Bolton’s exit. Secondly, Ambassador Yun suggested that the launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) before the negotiation hurt the nuclear talk. He also illustrated that mutual expectation between the U.S. and North Korea are so far apart that it is impossible to abridge gap in one meeting, and thus, they need to spend more time to negotiate.  

Lastly, he provided his view on an interim deal. He argued that the U.S. position toward denuclearization is ambiguous. While the U.S. is looking for “freeze” in North Korea nuclear production, it is difficult to verify what the “freeze” means and the time span is also very difficult to be ideal. Therefore, the U.S. should clarify and extend the definition in order to make an interim deal with North Korea possible on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. For North Korea, a roadmap to commit denuclearization and normalization is very essential. Ambassador Yun also added that the next working level meeting should be based on the peace process.  

Ambassador Yun’s talk was followed by the Q&A session, moderated by Yonho Kim. The importance of restoration of UNSC resolutions on sanctions at the working level negotiation in Stockholm was discussed, on which Ambassador Yun commented that he thinks although working level negotiation gives the opportunity to be reversed, it is difficult to reverse until there is a consent in the international community and dealing with nuclear negotiation bilaterally would not be always helpful and thus should broaden the negotiation, especially including China and South Korea. 

Furthermore, there was a discussion on whether President Trump has a clear red line on nuclear or missile test by North Korea land what further provocations would be ignorable for Trump administration. Ambassador Yun answered that the clear red line is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing and if North Korea crosses this red line, President Trump would perceive it as threats and would respond to a crisis. However, Ambassador Yun added that the problem a satellite launch. The U.S. may treat it as a long-range missile launch and the U.S. administration has not clarified it yet.  

Other questions included how far both the U.S. and North Korea can go in terms of denuclearization and peace before the 2020 presidential election if both Washington and Pyongyang come closer to a compromise in the best-case scenario. Ambassador Yun provided his view that the best and realistic scenario for North Korea to agree is to give up more than Yongbyon, the center of any attempt to denuclearize, and it could promise a “freeze” in its nuclear production and elaborate on how it could verify “freeze,” though he views the verification as a tricky element. Therefore, both the U.S. and North Kora have to come to the agreement of what ‘verification’ means. From the U.S. side, he said that some sanctions reliefs can be involved and having a second track process of denuclearization are also paramount.