On October 14, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “Prospects for a Nuclear Deal with North Korea.” Moderated by Yonho Kim, Associate Director of Institute for Korean Studies, Ambassador Joseph Yun, former U.S. Representative for North Korea Policy (2016-18), discussed whether these Trump-Kim meetings are just photo-ops or if they could lead to an agreement that will denuclearize North Korea and thus change the Korean Peninsula and the region. 

Ambassador Yun started with timeline for the recent events, pointing out that on January 20, 2017, Donald Trump came into the office as the President, and there was a regime change in the U.S. and North Korea, which was willing to discuss with the U.S. Then, Kim Jung Nam was killed in the following month, and it was when tension was arising in terms of military hostility. The likelihood of military accidence was rising with President Trump criticizing Kim Jung-Un’s behavior in regard to his nuclear weapon program. 

However, Ambassador demonstrated that things have changed when Moon Jae-In sworn in as the president of South Korea in May 10, 2017. President Moon improved relations with Pyongyang and determined that the tension with North Korea would be reduced. Ambassador Yun suggested a few effects of Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore, including decrease in tension, suspended intercontinental ballistic missile testing, the U.S. giving up a joint exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, and alleviated sanctions of enforcement by Russia.   

Later, Ambassador Yun suggested a few reasons why there has been no agreement, including lack of preparation and two mistakes of North Korea. He said that the U.S. has conducted repetition of their previous actions so that they failed again and again. Meanwhile, he pointed out that North Korea made two mistakes before the Stockholm meeting. Firstly, he argued that North Korea misperceived that John Bolton’s exit would adjust the U.S. position toward North Korea radically while there were several reasons for Bolton’s exit. Secondly, Ambassador Yun suggested that the launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) before the negotiation hurt the nuclear talk. He also illustrated that mutual expectation between the U.S. and North Korea are so far apart that it is impossible to abridge gap in one meeting, and thus, they need to spend more time to negotiate.  

Lastly, he provided his view on an interim deal. He argued that the U.S. position toward denuclearization is ambiguous. While the U.S. is looking for “freeze” in North Korea nuclear production, it is difficult to verify what the “freeze” means and the time span is also very difficult to be ideal. Therefore, the U.S. should clarify and extend the definition in order to make an interim deal with North Korea possible on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. For North Korea, a roadmap to commit denuclearization and normalization is very essential. Ambassador Yun also added that the next working level meeting should be based on the peace process.  

Ambassador Yun’s talk was followed by the Q&A session, moderated by Yonho Kim. The importance of restoration of UNSC resolutions on sanctions at the working level negotiation in Stockholm was discussed, on which Ambassador Yun commented that he thinks although working level negotiation gives the opportunity to be reversed, it is difficult to reverse until there is a consent in the international community and dealing with nuclear negotiation bilaterally would not be always helpful and thus should broaden the negotiation, especially including China and South Korea. 

Furthermore, there was a discussion on whether President Trump has a clear red line on nuclear or missile test by North Korea land what further provocations would be ignorable for Trump administration. Ambassador Yun answered that the clear red line is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing and if North Korea crosses this red line, President Trump would perceive it as threats and would respond to a crisis. However, Ambassador Yun added that the problem a satellite launch. The U.S. may treat it as a long-range missile launch and the U.S. administration has not clarified it yet.  

Other questions included how far both the U.S. and North Korea can go in terms of denuclearization and peace before the 2020 presidential election if both Washington and Pyongyang come closer to a compromise in the best-case scenario. Ambassador Yun provided his view that the best and realistic scenario for North Korea to agree is to give up more than Yongbyon, the center of any attempt to denuclearize, and it could promise a “freeze” in its nuclear production and elaborate on how it could verify “freeze,” though he views the verification as a tricky element. Therefore, both the U.S. and North Kora have to come to the agreement of what ‘verification’ means. From the U.S. side, he said that some sanctions reliefs can be involved and having a second track process of denuclearization are also paramount.