Category: Korea Policy Forum

On April 26^th, 2021, the GW Institute for Korean Studies (GWIKS) hosted the Korea Policy Forum on “U.S.-ROK Relations: Challenges and Opportunities under the Biden Administration”. The event was moderated by Professor Jisoo Kim, Director of GWIKS and, the forum’s speaker was Congressman Andy Kim (D-NJ), a member of the House Armed Services and House Foreign Affairs Committees in the House and former State Department, Pentagon, and White House National Security Council official. Congressman Andy Kim discusses the reshaping of the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the Biden Administration. He further discusses the strategic alliance between the two countries and how it defines a renewed approach towards North Korea, the future policy that shapes the relationship with China, and its far-reaching implications to the regional and global economies.

Congressman Andy Kim began the presentation by sharing his personal experiences and how the changing relationship between the U.S.-ROK reflects upon his family’s three generations. He states that when we look at how to shape the future of the relationship between the two nations, it is important to acknowledge the challenges that lie ahead. He further states that while in the post-COVID world a lot has changed, but for the U.S. and South Korea, the threat of an unstable and aggressive North Korea armed with nuclear weapons remains a constant. He also shares his insights on the upcoming meeting between President Moon and President Biden. Congressman Andy Kim’s presentation was followed by a Q&A session. The audience submitted a wide range of questions, including what the general perception of North Korea is in the Congress and how supportive they would be of a nuclear deal with North Korea, the United States’ approach towards the unstable relationship between the U.S-ROK due to the historical and territorial issues, views on how historical revisionism in Japan endangers U.S. security, Congressman Andy Kim’s views on the outcomes of the upcoming visit of President Moon to the United States, etc.

On September 22, 2020, the GW Institute for Korea (GWIKS) and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “U.S.-Korean Relations in the Era of U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry”. Moderated by Yonho Kim, Associate Director of the GW Institute for Korea, a roundtable of policy experts, representing both the United States and South Korea, engaged in a two-section discussion regarding changing dynamics in U.S.-China relations and how U.S.-Korean relations will affect or be affected by the growing tension between the two rivals.

Section one began with opening remarks from Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder, and Principal of The Marathon Initiative, and Heung-kyu Kim, Director of the U.S.-China Policy Institute at Ajou University, who both outlined the changing dynamics and relationships in play between the U.S., China, South Korea through the lenses of their respective countries. In the case of the United States, there is a grounded, straightforward approach of the continued U.S.-South Korean defensive alliance to balance against the growing threat of China, with the United States backing South Korea with continued military support and a “whole government” support system back in Washington. This comes with an increasing desire for South Korea to take steps to improve its own defense capabilities and notably, taking the lead with dealing with North Korea, a posture that has already begun through continued dialogue across the peninsula.

From the perspective of South Korea comes a fleshed out, broader outline of how the United States and China’s contention is affecting the country, which then leads into some of the disconnects and challenges posed due to their position in the alliance. Where the United States sees China as its direct rival, South Korea does not have that shared perspective due to its economic relationship with China. While South Korea is a strong ally of the United and shares concerns over growing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, their primary concern in regards to this contention is the ramifications of decoupling from China, who provide a large majority of economic incentive not just to South Korea but many of the other countries in the region. Additionally, China is also a strategic player in the denuclearization efforts of North Korea. Combined with a “confidence dilemma”, as Director Hueng-Kyu Kim describes it, of United States’ commitment and role in the Asian Pacific due to its confusing rhetoric and behavior over the years, puts South Korea in an awkward position of being morally on the same page as the United States but having a strategic gap on how to address China; a dilemma that SK-Korea Foundation Chair Jung Park believes China will take advantage of to boost its own influence in the region.

Shifting over to section two, discussing U.S.-South Korean relations in the face of growing concerns over China, Seoul National University Professor Chaesung Chun framed this conversation around two questions: what is the ultimate goal of U.S.-China policy and how might the United States and South Korea overcome challenges amongst themselves to address these issues of contention? And interesting perspective brought up by Sung-Han Kim, Dean of GSIS at Korea University brought up in the conversation of section one was that the United States and South Korea’s strategies against China could be comparable to a Balance of Power versus Containment perspectives. Where the United States wants to ensure that China does not overstep its boundaries and gain dominance in the region, South Korea is more preoccupied with ensuring Chinese aggression does not disrupt the region but does not wish to eliminate them completely. This difference in perspective plays into the disconnect between allies where the United States believes in a military approach is best in contrast to South Korea, who has taken a diplomatic and economic approach with neighboring countries and would urge the United States to step up in its own role by committing to the region similarly in order to maintain collective security against China’s behavior.

In wrapping up the roundtable discussion and considering how to address the challenges faced by both countries, many of the experts on both sides, despite having conflicting perspectives on the posturing of each other’s countries, were able to agree that discussions like these are what continues to embolden the dedicated alliance between the United States and South Korea. Continued communication and narrowing down strategies in both policy and defense are needed to ensure not only the protection and interests of both countries but to maintain peace in the South Pacific region.

On November 4, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia National Resource Center co-hosted the Korea Policy Forum on “Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula.” Yong-Sup Han, Professor at the Korea National Defense University, South Korea, discussed four potential scenarios of North Korea’s denuclearization: (i) a small deal in denuclearization (shutdown of Youngbyon plus α nuclear facilities in return for U.S. sanctions relief) and phase-1 conventional arms control (September 19 inter–Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement), (ii) a big deal in denuclearization (Final and Fully Verifiable Denuclearization of North Korean nuclear facilities and arsenal) and phase-1 conventional arms control, (iii) a small deal and phase-2 (structured) conventional arms control, and (iv) a big deal and phase-2 (structured) conventional arms control. Professor Han suggested that scenario (i) is most likely because it will allow North Korea to manage to maintain peace while implementing the September 19 inter–Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement, without having to move toward the phase-2 conventional arms control. Professor Han predicted that if Washington and Pyongyang strike a small deal, Pyongyang would want to remain as a nuclear weapon state with small arsenal.

Young-jun Kim, Professor at the Korea National Defense University, discussed the current status and the future of conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula. Professor Kim discussed the importance of Kim Jong-Un’s political objectives, including his goal of becoming independent from China and strengthening North Korean middle class for his long-term political survival. He stressed that North Korea’s motivation for conventional arms control changed from the military-first to a pragmatic economy-first policy. Professor Kim suggested that the U.S. and South Korea share long-term political and strategic objectives and design concrete steps of conventional arms control together.

Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affair at the George Washington University, pointed out the two presenters highlighted the classic dilemma in terms of determining the scale and scope and inherent values of arms control. Professor Spear suggested that to be more realistic, the denuclearization scenarios should include stasis where Washington and Pyongyang would not be able to make any breakthrough. She also stressed that U.S.  domestic politics should be factored in because the next U.S. president may have different perspectives from the Trump administration on the negotiation with North Korea.

On October 1, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia Resource Center held a Korea Policy Forum on “The U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry and the Korean Peninsula.” GWIKS brought together three experts, from South Korea, the United States, and China, who provided insights from each country’s viewpoints. The speakers discussed how the changing strategic equations surrounding the Korean peninsula will impact the security and prosperity in the region and the strategic choices and paths for the Korean peninsula.

Heung-Kyu Kim, the Founder and Director of China Policy Institute and professor in the Department of Political Science at Ajou University, South Korea, talked about the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition that has brought unprecedented challenges to South Korea’s security, foreign policies and economy. He explained that South Korea finds itself caught between the U.S. and China while being forced to make decisions. Because of this, South Korea’s traditional foreign policy orientation is no longer effective. Dr. Kim further talked about Chinese response to the competition, stating that “Chinese leadership at last fully recognized by May of 2019 that there is little chance of compromise with the U.S.” Therefore, he emphasized that South Korea may need a role of 3rd party in this competition in order to provide a space for restraints from, balancing in, mediating the competition. Dr. Kim suggested Australia as the third party to enlarge the role of middle power cooperation in his conclusion of this speech.

Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, touched on the issue of where the Korean issues stand in the U.S.-China relationship, and also reviewed how the Obama and Trump administrations have failed in terms of managing North Korean issues. While the U.S. have been continuously seeking Chinese cooperation over the U.S. Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, Mr. Snyder stressed that the U.S. needs more strategies to successfully attract China on the table as North Korea also valued the meeting between Obama and Xi Jinping as an opportunity to cooperate.

Jiyong Zheng, Professor and Director at the Center for Korean Studies, Fudan University, and Secretary-General of Shanghai Institute of Korean Studies, began with talking about the uncertainty of the relationship between the U.S. and China that caused significant confusion and fear to North and South Korea. He argued that China’s Korean peninsula policy needs to be integrated into the international community while connecting with its Belt and Road Initiative. This is because, Dr. Zheng explained, a relaxed and benevolent external environment will be created in North Korea in order to receive foreign assistance and realize sustained economic development. He stated that the idea of “nuclear weapons for peace” would more likely be replaced by “development for peace” when foreign assistance gets involved. Dr. Zheng concluded that “a commonwealth of the destiny of Northeast Asia will then be established” when North Korea receives substantial benefits from economic development because North Korea will: (i) be glad to construct a commonwealth of interests with Northeast Asian countries; and (ii) integrate itself into this region through shared perception of history, security, and development.

On October 14, 2019, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “Prospects for a Nuclear Deal with North Korea.” Moderated by Yonho Kim, Associate Director of Institute for Korean Studies, Ambassador Joseph Yun, former U.S. Representative for North Korea Policy (2016-18), discussed whether these Trump-Kim meetings are just photo-ops or if they could lead to an agreement that will denuclearize North Korea and thus change the Korean Peninsula and the region. 

Ambassador Yun started with timeline for the recent events, pointing out that on January 20, 2017, Donald Trump came into the office as the President, and there was a regime change in the U.S. and North Korea, which was willing to discuss with the U.S. Then, Kim Jung Nam was killed in the following month, and it was when tension was arising in terms of military hostility. The likelihood of military accidence was rising with President Trump criticizing Kim Jung-Un’s behavior in regard to his nuclear weapon program. 

However, Ambassador demonstrated that things have changed when Moon Jae-In sworn in as the president of South Korea in May 10, 2017. President Moon improved relations with Pyongyang and determined that the tension with North Korea would be reduced. Ambassador Yun suggested a few effects of Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore, including decrease in tension, suspended intercontinental ballistic missile testing, the U.S. giving up a joint exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, and alleviated sanctions of enforcement by Russia.   

Later, Ambassador Yun suggested a few reasons why there has been no agreement, including lack of preparation and two mistakes of North Korea. He said that the U.S. has conducted repetition of their previous actions so that they failed again and again. Meanwhile, he pointed out that North Korea made two mistakes before the Stockholm meeting. Firstly, he argued that North Korea misperceived that John Bolton’s exit would adjust the U.S. position toward North Korea radically while there were several reasons for Bolton’s exit. Secondly, Ambassador Yun suggested that the launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) before the negotiation hurt the nuclear talk. He also illustrated that mutual expectation between the U.S. and North Korea are so far apart that it is impossible to abridge gap in one meeting, and thus, they need to spend more time to negotiate.  

Lastly, he provided his view on an interim deal. He argued that the U.S. position toward denuclearization is ambiguous. While the U.S. is looking for “freeze” in North Korea nuclear production, it is difficult to verify what the “freeze” means and the time span is also very difficult to be ideal. Therefore, the U.S. should clarify and extend the definition in order to make an interim deal with North Korea possible on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. For North Korea, a roadmap to commit denuclearization and normalization is very essential. Ambassador Yun also added that the next working level meeting should be based on the peace process.  

Ambassador Yun’s talk was followed by the Q&A session, moderated by Yonho Kim. The importance of restoration of UNSC resolutions on sanctions at the working level negotiation in Stockholm was discussed, on which Ambassador Yun commented that he thinks although working level negotiation gives the opportunity to be reversed, it is difficult to reverse until there is a consent in the international community and dealing with nuclear negotiation bilaterally would not be always helpful and thus should broaden the negotiation, especially including China and South Korea. 

Furthermore, there was a discussion on whether President Trump has a clear red line on nuclear or missile test by North Korea land what further provocations would be ignorable for Trump administration. Ambassador Yun answered that the clear red line is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing and if North Korea crosses this red line, President Trump would perceive it as threats and would respond to a crisis. However, Ambassador Yun added that the problem a satellite launch. The U.S. may treat it as a long-range missile launch and the U.S. administration has not clarified it yet.  

Other questions included how far both the U.S. and North Korea can go in terms of denuclearization and peace before the 2020 presidential election if both Washington and Pyongyang come closer to a compromise in the best-case scenario. Ambassador Yun provided his view that the best and realistic scenario for North Korea to agree is to give up more than Yongbyon, the center of any attempt to denuclearize, and it could promise a “freeze” in its nuclear production and elaborate on how it could verify “freeze,” though he views the verification as a tricky element. Therefore, both the U.S. and North Kora have to come to the agreement of what ‘verification’ means. From the U.S. side, he said that some sanctions reliefs can be involved and having a second track process of denuclearization are also paramount. 

On February 14, 2020, GWIKS and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “Energy Cooperation between Korea and the U.S.: Opportunities and Challenges.” Moderated by Yonho Kim, Associate Director of the GW Institute for Korea, Dr. Jae-Seung Lee reviewed the core agenda in energy security between the U.S. and Korea and addressed key opportunities and challenges of U.S.-ROK energy cooperation. Followed by Dr. Lee’s talk, Professor Thomas Nicholas Russo commented on Dr. Lee’s presentation as discussant.

Dr. Lee started his talk highlighting that energy security has long been a key policy agenda for Korea and the United States (U.S.). Unlike the past where Middle East was the major oil supplier, a shale energy revolution in the U.S. since the late 2000s has brought the new architecture of energy partnership. He explained that Korea has begun to diversify oil imports in recent years, increasing the U.S. crude oil import. He demonstrated that the share of Iranian crude oil imports dropped to 5.2% in 2018 compared to 13.2% in 2017, while the share of the U.S. crude oil import increased to 5.4% in 2018 compared to 1.2% in 2017. Moreover, since early 2018, the U.S. became the largest crude oil producer in the world. Korea became the second-largest importer of the U.S. crude oil in 2018, followed by Canada.

Dr. Lee sent on and discussed the trend of Korea’s natural gas import and U.S. natural gas export. He showed that an increasing trend in natural gas import has been observed in Korea and that Korea has been trying to diversify the importing countries which resulted in Korea’s LNG import from 23 countries in 2018 compared to 11 countries in 2008. Meanwhile, the U.S. became the 4^th largest exporter in the global LNG market in 2018 with Korea being the largest importer of U.S. LNG and saw the increase of the share of LNG in the U.S. total natural gas exports.

Thirdly, Dr. Lee discussed the trend in petroleum industries in Korea and the U.S. Being the 3^rd largest U.S. propane importer in 2018, Korea also exported petrochemical products in 2018 which led Korea to compete with the U.S. He said that as both Korea and the U.S. have expanded their refinery and petrochemical industries, these sectors need to find a mutually complementary business portfolio while avoiding unnecessary competition.

However, in other sectors including oil and gas, Dr. Lee emphasized that Korea and the U.S can cooperate to diversify the energy import and to build a reliable partnership respectively. The U.S. crude oil and LNG are available options for Korea’s import diversification strategy as Korea decreases dependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas. Considering other Northeast Asian countries with China being in trade conflicts and Japan reducing LNG imports as it re-operates nuclear power, Korea is a good option for the U.S. as it can expect the continued growth of the U.S. crude oil and LNG imports. Yet, Dr. Lee left a caveat that the cost competitiveness and quality should remain positive, especially considering the Asia premium versus Alliance premium.

Following the discussion of traditional energy, Dr. Lee discussed the alternative energies, including renewables and nuclear energy. He showed the increasing trend of renewable energy generation in both countries as the concerns about climate change increases and said that renewable energy and low carbon projects are receiving enormous attention in both countries for a smooth energy transition. He picked automobile and IT industries for facilitating cooperation in the energy sector since two industries are closely related. Regarding nuclear energy, he explained that despite the decreasing trend of nuclear generation in Korea due to Moon’s plan for ‘phase-out,’ Korea will still relay on current projects for the next few decades. On the other hand, nuclear energy is regarded as a key element of national security and there is a mix of restrictions and hope in the U.S. He highlighted that alliance matters in Korea-U.S. nuclear energy.

In addition, Dr. Lee introduced the Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy in Asia (Asia EDGE), an initiative of the U.S. government to secure energy and develop energy markets in the Indo-Pacific region, and New Southern Policy of Korea which aims to diversify the trading routes and reduce external risks, seeking cooperation with ASEAN countries and India along with the U.S. and Canada. He saw opportunities in expanding technologies with regard to renewable and energy infrastructure business in Southeast and South Asia. However, some of the challenges included difficulties in changing the conceptual approach into the concrete agenda and projects and in guaranteeing mutual benefits and prosperities.

Lastly, he ended with a few suggestions that need further consideration, such as dealing with geopolitical risks, institutionalizing and coordinating the ROK-U.S. energy security dialogue, and strengthening energy cooperation within the ROK-U.S. alliance.

On January 29, 2020, GW Institute for Korean Studies and East Asia National Resource Center co-sponsored the Korea Policy Forum on “Korean Politics 2020-Korean Security Issues and Challenges.” Moderated by Jisoo M. Kim, Director of Institute for Korean Studies, Young-Jun Kim, Professor at Korea National Defense University and Sang-Hyun Lee, Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute gave talks on the prospects of a new domestic political geography in South Korea and its potential impact on Seoul’s foreign and security policy.

Firstly, Professor Young-Jun Kim gave a talk on “2020 Korea Politics and Korea Security Issues and Challenges.” Based on the previous elections in Korea, including the 2016 general election and the 2017 presidential election, he discussed the issues that might affect the result of the 2020 general election that will happen in April 2020. He started his talk by showing the poll that shows the support rate for each part in 2016 before the election. Prof. Kim introduced the major security issues that mattered in the 2016 election, including North Korea’s 4^th nuclear weapons test, close of the Kaesung industrial complex, and filibuster to block the anti-terrorism bill. He explained that although Saenuri Party, the ruling party at the time, seemed to win the election according to the poll, it was actually the Democratic Party of Korea that won the election which was a failure for the ruling party. Then, he moved on to the 2017 presidential election and demonstrated that national security issues did not really influence the election, but instead, the impeachment and Choi Sun-Sil scandal were the most important factors in the 2017 election. He showed the recent survey that predicts the victory of the Democratic Party of Korea but also pointed out that the 2016 election result shows that the survey prediction is not always correct. Lastly, he introduced some security issues that South Korea faces, including denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Japanese relations, and defense policy issues. At the same time, he left a caveat that domestic issues play more important roles in the general election.

Followed by Prof. Kim’s talk, Dr. Sang-Hyun Lee gave his talk on “Korean Peninsula in 2020: Security Challenges and Prospects.” Dr. Lee started his talk, pointing out the unusual four-day party plenum that announced important decisions instead of announcing the supreme leader’s New Year’s speech. He posed a question about whether Kim Jung-Un is on the ‘new way’ or going back to the ‘old way.’ He said that Kim declared that self-reliance and economic construction all-out efforts will be his new way- in fact, returning to the ‘byeongjin line,’ but Kim is considered to have returned to the ‘old way.’ While Moon’s government has launched the peace initiative with New Korean peninsula regime and triple peace initiatives and has pained the rosy picture, Dr. Lee demonstrated that the reality is harsh and cold as the success of the New Korean peninsula regime and triple peace initiatives depend on progress in improving inter-Korean relations and denuclearization, both of which are now stalled. In addition, he discussed the weakening of denuclearization/WMD-related regimes and of norms and rule-based governance. Lastly, he introduced some of the future challenges that the Korean peninsula face, including elections and politics in South Korea and the United States and challenges for South Korean government, such as worsening inter-Korean relations, differences in the policy priorities, the U.S.-China strategic competition, and the U.S.-ROK policy coordination.

On April 15^th, 2021, the GW Institute for Korean Studies (GWIKS) hosted the Korea Policy Forum “How Institutions Matter in Pandemic Responses: The South Korean Case”. The forum’s speaker was Dr. June Park, an East Asia Voices Initiative (EAVI) Fellow of the East Asia National Resource Center at the Elliot School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and the discussant was Dr. Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs of George Washington University. The discussion was moderated by Professor Yonho Kim, Associate Research Professor of Practice and the Associate Director of the GW Institute for Korean Studies. The forum focuses on Dr. Park’s contribution to the forthcoming book Coronavirus Politics’ chapter on the South Korean pandemic governance on COVID-19 encompassing South Korea’s public health (3Ts: Testing, Tracing, Treatment) and social policies.

 

Dr. Park begins her discussion by providing background information on what happened in 2015 (Failure in MERS) and changes in policies that were made post-MERS pandemic. She also stated that without further upgrades in the pandemic governance procedures, the incumbents will be forced out of power in the next year’s Presidential Elections. Dr. Park’s presentation was followed by Dr. Arrington’s discussion on the topic. Following the discussions, the moderator moved onto a Q&A session. The audience submitted a wide range of questions, including election and COVID-19 management, what role autonomy or close collaboration between state and business play in explaining positive outcomes to South Korea’s response to COVID, and the interaction between populist politics and health institutions.