Event Summaries – Page 7 – GW Institute for Korean Studies

March 20, 2019, Panel Discussion co-sponsored by the GWIKS and the Sigur Center

March 25, 2019August 6, 2021Event SummariesLeave a Comment

On March 20, 2019, GWIKS and Sigur Center for Asian Studies co-sponsored a panel discussion with Professor Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, Director Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center, Professor Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and Professor Ji-Young Lee, C.W.Lim and Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies at American University’s School of International Service, on “Japan-South Korea Relations in Crisis: Prospects for Reconciliation and Security Cooperation in East Asia”.

Moderated by Professor Jisoo M. Kim, Director of the Institute for Korean Studies at GW, the panels initiated their discussion with Professor Arrington’s remark on South Korean Supreme Court’s order in October 2018 against Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal to compensate plaintiffs. In November 2018, a similar ruling for two batches of plaintiffs came out. In both of these complicated and multi-faceted legal disputes, South Korean Supreme Court requested compensations for those who were forced into physical labor and sexual slavery. Japanese sources are referring to the claimants as wartime labors instead of forced labor. The underpaid or unpaid labors have been subject of legal disputes for over two decades and since the 2012 ruling, more than five South Korean courts have agreed with the rulings that 1965 basic treaty between Japan and South Korea did not erase individual’s rights to claim compensation. However, the 2018 ruling was based on a new layer of logic that the entire Japanese colonial rule period was illegal. In addition, South Korean Truth Commission regarding forced mobilization of workers has documented that some 300 Japanese firms were involved in the disputed labor and more than 200,000 Korean workers were mobilized workers. These legal processes have much more political and socio-political implications than mere victory in court and have ignited political complications between the Japanese and South Korean governments.

Director Tatsumi began her remarks by mentioning the fire control radar lock-on incident in December 2018. Japanese Ministry of Defense issued an announcement that South Korean Navy destroyer directed its fire-control radar at Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force’s surveillance aircraft. Both Japanese government and South Korean Navy presented conflicting claims about the incident, blaming each other. The Japanese government claimed that the aircraft attempted to communicate with the vessel using three different radio frequencies but received no response. The South Korean Navy responded that the destroyer was in waters for humanitarian rescue mission and that the Japanese aircraft was flying at a dangerously low altitude. Despite efforts to resolve the issue at working levels, both sides have not yet reached a consensus. Director Tatsumi highlighted that the reason this incident that escalated to near warfare between Japan and South Korea and has not yet been resolved pertains to the current dysfunctional state of Japan-South Korea relations and reveals how grave the conflict between the two nations is. The underlining sectors of Japan-South Korea relations are: business community and defense. She revealed concern about the prospects of the Japan-South Korea relations, since both of the sectors have been damaged,

Professor Mochizuki argued that Japan-South Korea relations is not locked in a permanent state of historical animosity as he drew on public opinion poll data that suggests gradual improvement on South Korean perspective on Japan over the past years. The percentage of South Koreans who have a negative impression on Japan has declined from 76% to 50% and the percentage of South Koreans who have positive impression of Japan has increased from 12% to 28%. According to one Japanese research, 77% of the Japanese do not trust South Korea. However, since 1998 Obuchi-Kim Summit and joint declaration, there has been gradual improvement in affinity of Japan toward South Korea and over 60% of Japanese had favorable feelings toward South Korea. Along with social and cultural exchanges, efforts of political leaders on both sides contributed in the de-escalation of harsh feelings toward each other. Professor Mochizuki claimed that it is the persistent criticism on historical issues that leads to the negative impression toward South Korea in the eyes of the Japanese. He believes that this is because the dominant narrative in Japanese colonial past is the conservative narrative and that unless this narrative changes, the conflict between the two nations cannot be resolved.

Professor Lee listed three major drivers in South Korea-Japan relations that may explain the high level of tension between the two nations: South Korea’s hesitancy on its China policy, weakened link of North Korea’s propagation and policy coordination that previously brought the two nations together, and collapsed earlier agreements on historical issues. Current South Korean government’s prioritization inter-Korean reconciliation has not only jeopardized South Korea-U.S. relations, but South Korea-Japan relations as well. She claimed that South Korea’s strategic hold toward rising China does not naturally converge with that of Japan. Despite China having historically been the sole power until the 20th century, Japan and Korea had never formed an alliance to contest China. Even to this day, South Korea is geographically and politically (regarding reconciliation with North Korea and reunification) more vulnerable to China compared to Japan, and thus in a harder position to form alliance against China. South Korea and Japan, while having been constantly disagreeing on numerous terms, have always been a common approach toward North Korea: strong deterrence. However, with the two U.S.-North Korea summits conducted recently and current Moon Jae-in administration striving to reconcile inter-Korean relations, this link of mutual antagonization toward North Korea is weakened. Professor Lee claimed that the currently South Korean government has little incentives to improve relations with Japan.

The Soh Jaipil Circle on Contemporary Korean Affairs: John Merrill, “The Jeju 4.3 Incident, Korea’s ‘Dark History,’ and Its Implications for North Korea Policy.”

February 20, 2019August 6, 2021Event Summaries, Soh Jaipil Circle on Contemporary Korean Affairs1 Comment

GWIKS hosted a Soh Jaipil Circle event on February 14th, 2019 with John Merrill, the former chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, on “The Jeju 4.3 Incident, Korea’s ‘Dark History,’ and Its Implications for North Korea Policy.” Moderated by Professor Celeste Arrington, Dr. Merrill began by explaining that what he refers to as the “Dark History” of Korea is so because the South Korean government has deliberately buried it. He explained that post-World War II history of Korea has been corrupted by series of authoritarian South Korean governments and only recently has it begun to be corrected. Dr. Merrill then pointed out that the tone of U.S. media coverage on current issues between U.S. and North Korea is filled with cynicism and bad analysis, and lacks self-awareness. He criticized that most of the commentators on the Korean issue are not keeping track of their own predictions. He then mentioned a Chosun Ilbo story from a few days before on South Korean legislatives’ meeting with the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. In particular, he pointed out Pelosi’s comment, “Well, I visited North Korea once before twenty years ago,” explaining that it exemplifies the misfortunate shallowness of many commentaries in seeing North Korea as ‘the land that time forgot.’ While everything in Korean Politics is changing rapidly, no one seems to be keeping track.

He then shared his personal experience with the dark history. When he first joined the State Department in the spring of 1987, he was on the Korean government’s blacklist as a banned author. Although he was soon removed from the blacklist, he had faced difficulties in performing his duties to interface with South Korean agencies, foreign ministry and the National Intelligence Service. Dr. Merrill explained that President Donald Trump lacks deep understanding of Modern Korean history and is totally disconnected from Washington establishment of Korean Watchers. His approach towards North Korea is quite different from that of U.S. media and commentators. It is based on feel, empathy, and schmoozing. Apparently, the schmoozing technique is working effectively with Kim Jong-un, particularly after being demonized for so long.

The manhwa, or comic strip, Dr. Merrill presented depicted the Monggumpo Operation of August 1949. In 1949, the South Korean navy launched a sneak attack on the North Korean fleet, the West Coast headquarter at Mongumpo on the personal orders of President Syngman Rhee, cutting out the entire U.S. military chain of command. The operation had been concealed because it suggests that South Korea was perhaps partially responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War, until President Lee Myung-bak revealed it to send a warning to North Korea. Dr. Merrill then proceeded to explain another hidden incident in South Korean history, the Jeju Uprising. An estimate of 30 thousand people who opposed separate election under U.S. occupation of South Korea. The police and military forces killed large number of the residents of the Jeju Island who protested and rioted in multiple occasions.

Dr. Merrill concluded the lecture by pointing out that the nuclear weapon issue on the Korean Peninsula is an action-reaction dynamic, initiated by the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea. In order to resolve conflicts, we must take alternative methods than simply pointing fingers and blaming each other. He explained that North Korea is the way it is now because the U.S. helped create the deeply traumatized state through deterrence and threat.

The Soh Jai Pil Circle on Contemporary Korean Affairs: David Kang, “North Korea in 2019: More of the Same, or a Historic Opportunity?”

January 25, 2019August 6, 2021Event Summaries, Soh Jaipil Circle on Contemporary Korean AffairsLeave a Comment

On January 23rd, 2019, GWIKS invited Professor David Kang, director of the USC Korean Studies Institute and Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, to lecture on “North Korea in 2019: More of the same, or a historic opportunity?”. Moderated by Professor Celeste Arrington, David Kang began by claiming that deterrence has been and still is a successful tactic for North Korea. North Korea and the U.S. had repeatedly threatened and provoked each other, and boasted its military capabilities. Professor Kang argued that the situations have changed and that there is a substantial opportunity for a game changer, despite the conventional American view on North Korea –skepticism.

Dr. Kang claimed that North Korea’s recent actions are not spontaneous responses to sanctions and Trump’s threats, but rather a long-term strategy that North Korea had put in place. He presented Kim Jong-un’s New Year speech from 2017 that announced Kim’s commitments to provide for his people and prepare for ICBM and nuclear weapon. During Kim’s New Year speech a year later in 2018, Kim proclaimed that North Korea has achieved its long desired goal of “perfecting the national nuclear forces” through 59 missile and nuclear tests conducted in 2017. Dr. Kang explained that North Korea had been evidently planning such tactic for years. Previously North Korea’s strategy was “stop us before we g,” but in 2017, North Korea have presented that it has the capacity and potential for nuclear warfare. Along with North Korea’s long-prepared entry to the Olympics, North Korea’s tactics had opened the door for negotiation.

Dr. Kang then proceeded to discuss South Korea’s strategy by presenting a Gallup poll. The poll revealed that the majority of South Koreans and the Americans desired to solve North Korean nuclear problems through means of diplomacy, rather than military confrontation. South Korean President, Moon Jae-in’s policy agrees well with the demand of the public, as he has a progressive left-wing political orientation. Progressive South Korean presidents have historically attempted to rebuild and normalize relations with North Korea and Moon eventually engaged in multiple Inter-Korean summits with Kim Jong-un. Dr. Kang explained that South Korean policies toward North Korea include fundamentally stabilizing the DMZ in order to end the aggression between the two Koreas.

Dr. Kang claimed that the possibility of North Korea denuclearizing before any negotiations is slim to none, despite the motives of the U.S. However, North Korea had made small-scale progresses over the past year, such as ceasing nuclear tests for fourteen months, dismantling nuclear test sites, releasing arrested American citizens, and stopping many Anti-American propaganda. Dr. Kang claimed that it is crucial for the U.S. to take action and make progress with North Korea instead of remaining highly skeptical. He concluded the lecture by arguing that North Korea is not a problem to be solved. It is crucial to view it as a real country without deeply held and contradicting stereotypes about North Korea: North Koreans are brainwashed and that North Koreans desperately desire freedom. Americans often overlook the fact that North Koreans are people with powerful nationalist ideology.

Lecture Series: “Book Talk: North Korean Human Rights and Transnational Advocacy”

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Director Jisoo M. Kim opened the event with welcoming comments and introduced the panelists.

Professor Andrew Yeo, Associate Professor of Catholic University of America, presented the new book “North Korean Human Rights: Activists and Networks” that he co-edited and shared his analysis on activism and advocacy networks for North Korean human rights.

There are increased global concerns regarding human rights abuses in North Korea. Some actors from the advocacy network, such as NGOs, Governments, grassroots groups, Think Tanks, and individuals are engaged in dealing with the problem. All of them share a common goal despite their different political positions or the way of approach. The book explains that the network of North Korean human rights consists of three-dimensional structure: domestic, transnational networks, and North Korean perspectives. The linkage between domestic and transnational networks explains the specific domestic issue (i.e., North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens) or mutual relations among them (i.e., Global pressure on South Korean legislative). There are three main questions raised and answered on the advocacy issue, which are emergence, impact, and theory. The author stressed that they differ over time and across space.

Professor Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Assistant Professor at the the George Washington University, introduced chapter four of the book, which she contributed in writing. It examined how the North Korean human rights issues included abductions. She explained the brief timeline of how abduction issue was handled internationally and how North Korea related activist groups in Japan are involved in formatting public understanding regarding not only for the abduction issues but also broader human right issues.

Mr. Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, recommended the book by expressing admiration of how the book covered the comprehensive history of North Korean human rights that several important organizations and networks have played a key role to speed up the movement towards North Korean human rights since the 1990s.

Soh Jaipil Circle “Post Trump-Kim Summit: What is the Next Step?”

September 13, 2018August 6, 2021Event Summaries, Soh Jaipil Circle on Contemporary Korean AffairsLeave a Comment

On September 11, 2018, GWIKS invited three experts in inter-Korean relations from South Korea for a talk regarding the next steps after the post Trump-Kim summit. At the start of the event Director Jisoo M. Kim of the GWIKS explained the background of the discussion and introduced Professor Immanuel Kim. Immanuel Kim served as a facilitator for the event and introduced the three panelists.

“North Korea Issue: Three-Level Games”

Dr. Sanghyun Lee, Senior Researcher of Sejong Institute, evaluated the summit in a perspective of what each country expected from the denuclearization agreement and stressed the importance of a complete denuclearization of North Korea. There was not much evidence of Kim giving up the nuclear weapons. Dr. Sanghyun Lee analyzed three reasons that made Kim join the negotiation table: confidence, fear, and mediation. Kim was confident of DPRK’s completion of national nuclear forces but unpredictable US policy by Trump made him concerned. The mediation by Moon and/or Xi also effectively played a role for him to come out and talk. However, the deep distrust of the US and further demand of North Korea were reconfirmed after the summit. The future would be composed of three dimensions; Inter-Korean Dimension, DPRK-US Dimension, and DPRK-International community dimension. The progress in each dimension should proceed concurrently for a successful global nuclear nonproliferation strategy.

“The Fate of Nuclear Weapons in North Korea”

Professor Yong-sup Han, Former Vice President of Korea National Defense University, emphasized the timeline of the North Korean nuclear program during ensuing generations of the Kim and compared the Singapore summit with previous North Korea denuclearization discussions in history. Defining denuclearization and using the right wording would have an impact on an effective negotiation with North Korea. “Verifiable dismantlement” should be used instead of denuclearization. He asserted that the US should lead in organizing verification teams, together with concerned countries and IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). He also emphasized that the DPRK-US meeting should be held in Washington D.C. instead of Pyongyang to effectively push the US’s agenda.

“A Paradigm Shift: Reverse-Kissinger Strategy”

Professor Youngjun Kim, from Korea National Defense University, proposed his interpretation of the two parties’ motivation for the summit. Kim’s motivation was to obtain domestic political support for his long-term regime and to become more independent from China. On the other hand, Trump was seeking to contain China by using North Korea. In that way, the US could expand its influence over South East Asia and Korea so that it can have a gray zone against China.

Joonho Kim’s “Economic Engagement with North Korea – Opportunities and Challenges”

April 27, 2018August 6, 2021Event Summaries, Soh Jaipil Circle on Contemporary Korean AffairsLeave a Comment

On April 27, GWIKS Soh Jaipil Circle invited Dr. Joongho Kim to deliver his presentation “Economic Engagement with North Korea – Opportunities and Challenges”. Dr. Kim is a current Visiting Scholar at GW Institute for Korean Studies and previously worked as a senior research fellow at the Research Institute for North Korea and Northeast Asia Development at the Export-Import Bank of Korea. In his presentation, Dr. Joongho Kim covered a wide range of topics including the political nature of North Korean economy, its shortcomings, economic changes under the Kim Jong Un regime and its potential for economic growth. Furthermore, Dr. Kim’s talk emphasized the need to understand both the political and business factors that affect the economy of North Korea, and stressed the importance of assisting North Korea in maximizing its potential for economic development. In addition, Dr. Kim pointed out several key tasks we must undertake to stimulate the future international investment and engagement in the North Korean economy. Firstly, we must anticipate signs of North Korea’s transitions and, secondly, properly evaluate inter-Korean economic cooperation. The presentation ended with a Q&A sessions where many of the questions asked by the audience related to Dr. Kim’s thoughts on which nation-state actor would be the most likely to actively seek out a participating role in the growth of North Korea’s economy.

Written by Soo-Jin Kweon