Second Soh Jaipil Circle – Jai Kwan Jung

For our second SJP Circle meeting, we had Dr. Jai Kwan Jung present his working research: “Why Is There No Rebellion in North Korea?” Dr. Jung is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. Prior to joining Korea University, he was an Assistant Professor of our own George Washington University in the Department of Political Science and the Elliott School of International Affairs. His research interests include political conflict and violence, party politics, and inter-Korean relations. He is now working on a book project on a comparative study of the North Korean Regime’s durability.

North Korea is the longest existing “non-monarchy dictatorship” country to have avoided any large scale rebellion. Therefore, a topic that explores possible explanations for this phenomenon is of interest to many scholars. In many other autocratic states rebellions are mostly started by elites with political grievances toward the inner circle. However, the North Korean regime was seen to have established an effective elite control system that prevents the well-educated elites from starting a rebellion. This talk provided empirical evidence regarding the elite control system in North Korea that was found by conducting in-depth interviews with high-ranking North Korean defectors.

Dr. Jung first examined the existing North Korea studies-related theories – Chuch’e ideology & supreme leader system, military first politics, and shadow economy – and proved how they weren’t fully explaining the reasons for not even having a small-scale rebellion since the 1990s. Even the academic answer – comparative authoritarianism – couldn’t explain how the collapse of the economy in North Korea still failed to bring about any rebellion. He sought to answer the question which other scholars or theories failed to fully answer. That is, “Why is there no rebellion in North Korea?”

The results of the qualitative research mainly focused on the elite control system in North Korea. One of the effective mean of controlling the elites was ideological control. The Chuch’e idealogy that emphasizes independence in politics, autonomy in the economy, and self-defense in the military worked well for the elite control in North Korea. However, there was skepticism that grew among elites, especially those with overseas experiences. The organizational control further explains the reason why North Korea didn’t see any rebelling organizations. The North Korean government executed “10 Principles” that strictly prohibited forming an organization or a voluntary association, which destroyed regional, family, school, and other social network ties. North Korea had no concept of social networks and didn’t have enough social capital for a rebellion to occur. The economic benefits for the inner elites were also seen as one of the main reasons that a rebellion didn’t occur. There was special distribution of goods and services for elites that made them satisfied with the current regime.

The conclusion of the talk was as follows:

  • As long as the elite control system functions properly as a whole, highly authoritarian countries like North Korea may avoid rebellion and a regime collapse.
  • There is a need to compare the elites’ perspective with other defectors’ perspectives to better assess the possibility of a regime collapse that may start from the bottom.
  • There is also the need to compare North Korea with other autocracies (e.g., Romania, Serbia, Libya) to figure out how elite schisms emerge and develop.

Written by Ann Yang

Korean Literature Essay Contest 2017

GWIKS is organizing the 2017 Korean Literature Essay Contest with the support of LTI Korea (Literature Translation Institute Korea). It is an opportunity for all undergraduates and graduates in the D.C. metropolitan area. The application is until July 30 and you may win prizes that will assist you with the start of your new semester! If you are interested in learning more about the contest and requirements, please click here.

Soh JaiPil Circle – The Second Talk: Why is There No Rebellion in North Korea?

Considering its dire economic conditions and abrupt leadership changes since the 1990s, North Korea has been considered one of the most likely autocracies that could experience a large scale rebellion. In reality, however, there has been no such internal turmoil so far. What can account for the absence of rebellion in North Korea? This talk is about a paper that seeks to answer this question based on the understanding of how rebel groups emerge in autocracies. Since rebel groups are generally formed by a small number of the relatively well-educated who have support networks and political grievances toward the inner circle of ruling elites, they argue that the North Korean regime established an effective elite control system that prevents an elite schism from developing into a rebellion. To support this argument, they draw empirical evidence from the historical development of elite control system in North Korea and in-depth interviews with high-ranking North Korean defectors.

April 26th, Wednesday
12:00 pm – 2:00 pm
Lunch will be provided.
The Elliott School of International Affairs
Chung-Wen Shih Conference Room
Sigur Center for Asian Studies
1957 E st. NW, Suite 503
Washington DC, 20052
with Jai Kwan Jung
Jai Kwan Jung (Ph.D., Cornell University) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. Prior to joining Korea University, he was a Korea Foundation Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Elliott School at the George Washington University. His research interests include political conflict and violence, party politics, and inter-Korean relations. His work has appeared in a number of academic journals such as Democratization, European Journal of Political Research, International Political Science Review, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Mobilization, and Pacific Focus. He is now working on a book project on a comparative study of the North Korean Regime’s durability.
Moderated By Celeste Arrington
Celeste Arrington is a Korea Foundation Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at GW. She is one of the core faculties of GWIKS and a member of the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation’s U.S.-Japan Network for the Future and its U.S.-Korea Scholar-Policymaker Nexus. She specializes in comparative politics, with a regional focus on the Koreas and Japan. Her research interests include civil society, social movements, democratic governance, law and society, policymaking processes, the media and politics, and qualitative methods. She is also interested in the international relations and security of Northeast Asia and transnational activism.

Words from a North Korea Defector: Sung Ho Ji, President of NAUH

March 3rd, Friday: Korean International Studies Organization (KISO) on North Korean Human Rights
Time: 15:00 to 16:30
Location: Elliott School of International Affairs B12.
Now Action & Unity for Human rights (NAUH) is an NGO, found in April, 2010, that works hand-in-hand with youths from South Korea, North Korea, and overseas with the aim of improving the human rights conditions in North Korea and further working to achieve unification in the Korean Peninsula.
President of NAUH, Sung Ho Ji, is a North Korean defector and he will give a short lecture on the miseries in North Korea and the role of the current generation, the young adults of the present days, for the improvement of the human rights conditions in North Korea.

Second Lecture Series – Yafeng Xia

Professor Yafeng Xia was invited as the second lecturer for the GW Institute for Korean Studies Lecture Series. This lecture attracted more than 70 people who are interested in the issues of Sino-North Korean relations. Yafeng Xia is currently a Professor of History at Long Island University in New York and Senior Research Fellow at Research Institute for Asian Neighborhood, East China Normal University in Shanghai. His lecture was about China’s policy towards North Korea during the Chinese Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969. He argues that despite the myth of the “brotherly affection” between China and North Korea, the relationship had reached its lowest ebb during the Cultural Revolution.

Yafeng Xia giving lecture next to projector in front of audience  Yafeng Xia presenting to room full of audience

With the Cultural Revolution, China had radical and uncompromising policies both domestically and internationally. Chinese leaders accused North Korean leaders that they had become revisionists and the Red guards verbally attacked Kim Il Sung. North Korea also wasn’t shy with criticizing China’s leftist opportunism, dogmatism, and chauvinism. It was during that time when the economic and military aid that China was providing to North Korea was suspended, no high-levels visited mutually, and no cultural or economic agreements were signed. Though, he reemphasized the fact that both countries remained sensitive to the fragile relationship as China left North Korea alone from the Cultural Revolution and Kim Il-Sung never once criticized the Chinese leaders by name in public. There was also bilateral trade that continued between the two countries though limited.

With the examination of the historical relationship between the two countries during Cold War, Professor Xia provided three interpretations from different perspectives:

  • Geopolitical and ideological perspectives: During the Cold War, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung maintained asymmetric alliance relations as a big power and a small power. Except for the period during the Cultural Revolution, Kim Il Sung visited China almost every year but Mao never set foot on North Korea. Nonetheless, Kim ensured North Korea’s political and diplomatic independence.
  • Cultural traditions and diplomacy perspectives: Post-WWII Sino-North Korean relations were in the process of transformation from a suzerain/vassal state to a modern state-to-state relationship. It was a struggle between China’s concept of a suzerain/vassal state relationship and North Korea’s Juche ideology and resistance to flunkeyism.
  • Code of conduct and political norms perspectives: The Sino-North Korean alliance demonstrated the structural drawbacks of relations among socialist states. Politically, China, “the big brother of this socialist family”, believed that it had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of “other members of the socialist family”, North Korea. On the other hand, the “younger brother”, North Korea, could be capricious and act shamelessly, while the “big brother”, China, endured the humiliation in order to carry out the common mission.

The lecture ended successfully with a high participation and vigorous questions. This event brought a lot of interest as the Sino-North Korean relationship is a subject that is not as commonly studied. We thank Professor Xia for taking his time to share his studies with the GW students, GW faculty members, and other scholars in DC.

Written by Ann Yang