On November 20th, 2020, the GW Institute for Korean Studies hosted “The Survival of the Chosŏn Dynasty in the Imjin War (1592-90) and the Issue of Governance” as part of their Soh Jaipil Lecture series. Joined by Dr. Nam-Lin Hur, Professor at the University of British Columbia, and moderated by GWIKS Director, Dr. Jisoo Kim, the lecture embarked on a historical journey, to trace back the events leading to the Japanese withdrawal from Chosŏn through a new perspective. In interpreting how the events unfolded leading to the Chosŏn Dynasty’s survival, Hur focuses on three key factors: Governance, Diplomacy, and Military. He argues, “Hideoyoshi’s (Japan) failure in achieving his original war goals had to do with, among a few major factors, Chosŏn Korea’s military operations of defense in 1592 – operations that capitalized on the military economies of small scale which was built into the governance of its military system.”

Reflecting back on Hideoyoshi’s goals, we find turning points that build upon one another to eventually push the Japanese out of Korea with each goal shattered. The primary goal was the subjugation of Korea under Japanese rule, which was undermined by different styles of governance and the uprising of Korean forces. When Hideoyoshi’s forces, the Daimyos, took Hansong, the capital at the time, they were under the assumption that by taking, the entire country submits under the conquerer’s control. His original grand strategy was by taking control of Hansong, and thereby the peninsula, the nation would be reorganized under the Japanese structure of Kaiso. In reviews of diplomatic letters and exchanges between Hideoyoshi, his forces, he made it clear that King Seonjo, the ruler of the Dynasty would become subject under him to rule over the new territory and was not to be killed.

However, the Kaizo belief was not commonplace under the Chosŏn Dynasty, and what the Japanese quickly learned is that they would have to assert governance in the neighboring provinces and countries in order to maintain their control. This alongside further the challenges by Korean forces, who despite acting in treason, took up arms against the Japanese to defend themselves. Traditionally, Koreans were not allowed to form any sort of military that was not under the King’s administration, though this instance was tolerated by King Seonjo within reason, allowing people to do so in small, local militias. This would cause the daimyos to become spread thin across the peninsula, weakening their overall capabilities. Ambush and strategic blocking against Japanese forces made it difficult to advance up towards China. At this point Hideoyoshi has ordered them to go north, assuming that the peninsula had already been subjugated and what they were dealing with was merely a handful of domestic rebellions. In reality, the uprisings made it difficult to retain access to resources to keep the Japanese going, which further thinned their military capabilities as deserting and pillaging became common. Compounded by the eventual entrance of the Chinese into the war, in the end, the Japanese had no choice but to withdraw.

Korea’s defense capitalized on the lack of proper governance, provisions of weapons, and guerillas undermined the Japanese forces that were spread thin, deserters, and lack of coordination and communications that overall, undermined the superior capabilities of the Japanese. Local based military operations on a small scale also made a huge difference, as the Chosŏn Dynasty did not have many soldiers and was not able to operate its military system. However, Chosŏn Korea’s Security System was devised by the local army and navy, central army, and majorly, diplomacy that all took advantage of their situation and resources to defend themselves. The outcome proved in 1592 that Japan had no way to subjugate or govern Korea as Hideoyoshi’s military goals were shattered by a military campaign ruined by Chosŏn’s determination to survive.